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Some Questions of the Introduction of Euro 
in Hungary2
The question of monetary integration was part of discussions on European integration 
from the beginning, in Hungary. That applied to Euro as well, and there was no question 
that it is part of our integration project. We have different waves of discussions, but there 
was an overwhelming support of the project from great number of the experts. The discussi-
ons were professional, less politicized and divided compared to Poland or Czech Republic, 
and several high quality studies were published on the issue. The discussions intensified 
again last year and early this year and several studies and articles were published. Among 
them, the initiative of Hungarian Nation Bank (HNB) on Maastricht22, and the dispute 
between the Hungarian Minister of Finances (Mihály Varga) and the president of HNB 
(György Matolcsy) got particular attention. I refer to two articles of the Journal of Coun-
terbalanace (Egyensúly), one from Bod Péter Ákos ((former President of the Hungarian 
National Bank) and István Dobozi (Former Lead Economist at the World Bank). This ar-
ticle refers and reflects on the main points of these discussions.
Some general remarks
The Euro is an economic and business project. Of course, its introduction and construction was 
determined by complex political expectations and interests, and it is important symbol of the 
political integration and unity of the European Union.
The Euro stands on two legs, its stability and future cannot be understood without them. 
These are partly the high level of integratedness of the EU, and partly the requirements of creation 
of the single market among the member countries.
Some years ago, we made an attempt to determine and measure of level of integratedness of 
countries and integration groupings. In the framework of so called Integration Profiles research 
we made these comparisons on the basis of about two dozens of parameters. Among them, 
such as intensity of relations, interconnectedness and interdependence, structural convergence, 
balances of trade, financial and capital relations, and some indicators of macro-convergence. 
We put the countries and organizations on a 100 per cent scale in 5 groupings. Accordingly, 
up to 10 per cent, there is no integration, from 10%, we can speak about low, from 30% about 
medium, from 50% high and from 70% very high levels of integration. We made calculations 
only about the EU. But on the ground of estimations, we could assume that in the last 50 years 
the global interconnectedness has surpassed the 10% level, and therefore, it is justified to speak 
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about “global integration”. It also seems that the integratedness level of the different interstate 
regional groupings (ASEAN, Mercosure, Nafta) has not reached the 30%, namely it remained 
on low level. At the same time, in total the EU surpassed the 50% (high) integration level. Among 
them, about 6-8 countries (small, developed and CEE countries including Hungary) fell into 
the above 70% category, namely they can qualify for extremely high integratedness. (Palánkai, 
2014/1 és 2017/3) 
At the high level of integration the savings on transaction costs can be high enough to 
influence substantially the competitiveness of the region. It is another question, how far they 
can be calculated exactly. The problem was similar with the customs union. The advantages were 
obvious, while in the analyses based on Viner methods proved to be marginal. Therefore, it is 
important to stress that the Euro is not just a political creature, but it is important element of 
competitiveness of EU economy. One should not forget about this when speaking about the too 
“early” introduction and relevance of the Euro. 
The other “leg” is the single European market. There is a large literature about the mutual 
assumption of the single market and the EMU. We refrain from discussing it, but we refer only 
on the divergence aspects.
The market liberalization among the countries with high differences in levels of developments 
and with oligopolistic market structures unavoidably leads to increasing inequalities of 
distributions of advantages of integration. Based on spontaneous market mechanisms, the rich 
countries get richer, while the poor get poorer. This problem was already clear by creation of 
the common market after 1968. But as this was demonstrated rather on regional levels instead 
of national ones, it was not by chance that after 1975 the Regional Development Fund was 
created. In reality, it served compensation, although the declared aim was rather promotion of 
development.
The increase of inequalities in the EU was basically connected to the single market, although 
it is the anomaly of the global capitalism. In absence of corrections and compensations these 
differences are deepened by spontaneous market mechanisms. The extension of regulated market 
economy to union level, therefore, should be a strategic aim. The Economic and Monetary Union 
and the single market should form a strategic unity. 
In policy integration, such fields as monetary, fiscal or financial policies play important role, 
and the money (Euro) is a basic tool. The increase of inequalities, therefore, does not follow from 
the Euro, but the EMU as an element regulated market economy model, among others should 
rather deal with inequality anomalies. It is another question how far the commitments of the 
Lisbon Treaty for „competitive social market economy” were fulfilled. (Palánkai 2017/1)
The Maastricht decisions on monetary integration were born for 12 members, but they were 
tailored rather to the 6 core countries. As result, the Maastricht criteria focused primarily to one 
single priority, namely price stability. The requirement of convergence was practically neglected, 
although in a heterogenic monetary union, the stability and coherence without it cannot be 
achieved. Perhaps, the explanation can be that Ireland and the three Mediterranean countries 
joining in the 1980s years, in the decade before Maastricht produced a spectacular convergence. 
Till the approving the Maastricht decisions, even the association agreements with the CEE 
countries have not been signed. At the time, the membership of these countries was not an 
agenda, and then from the end of 1990s, the convergence of the CEE regions was also spectacular.
Through enlargements the asymmetries of internal market (rules of which took force „upon 
entry”) increased substantially. The correspondence to optimal currency area was questioned 
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from the beginning, and by enlargements it was even so. In spite of convergence of per capita 
GDPs, the regional differences remained and due to overwhelming market positions of large 
companies of developed members, the market inequalities persisted. In these respects, contrary 
to some views, the role of the Euro cannot be identified.
One of the main arguments of opponents of the Euro is that we should achieve a certain 
level of development before joining the Euro-zone. In general, it should be stressed, however, that 
creation of a monetary union does not depend on level of development and its internal divergences. 
We have several monetary unions in different federations, let they be, India and Brazil, or US 
and Canada. It is another question that the construction of these monetary unions due to their 
specificities and endowments should be substantially differing. The specificities refer to level of 
developments and structures, to socio economic relations, political and historical traditions and 
many other factors.
The connection of introduction of the Euro to certain level of per capita GDP is not only 
theoretically, but also methodologically is false and misleading. The GDP is too much imperfect 
indicator for using for such an important strategic decision as Euro introduction. GDP is a mix 
of input and output data, and as it can take into account the actual expenditures, it is unable 
separate waist and corruption. A railway line can be built for 100 million Euros, but if it was built 
for 200 in reality, it is calculated on that. By this the waist and corruption become as a factor 
of growth. Of course, the main factors of competitiveness should be taken into account, like 
productivity, structural differences, state of trade balance and costs and many others.
Consequently, in the EU as well, the problems arose not just because of monetary union, but 
due to its given construction. It would be too long to analyse all of the deficiencies of the Euro, 
but at least, three of them can be specially mentioned. One was the overestimation of coordination 
and controlling role of the market mechanisms. As it turned out the market instead of disciplining 
rather inspired irresponsible attitudes (cheap money used for buying votes or speculating with 
real estate), and then only punished afterwards, in fact very cruelly. There were deficits in the 
construction of institutions and policies of the monetary union, which after 2010, in the process 
of reform of Euro governance were largely corrected, even if the full consolidation is not yet 
competed. Furthermore, the monetary integration would assume the strict adjustment and 
discipline of national policies.  In fact, the break and sabotaging of the rules, and the free riding 
characterised all of the countries, there were differences only in their extent and consequences. 
The Euro was a tool, but its guilt is fully irrelevant.
Euro and Hungary
I fully agree with those views, according to which the introduction of the Euro in Hungary is a 
general national interest. The excellent analysis of Bod Péter Ákos on the cost and benefits gives 
a complex and convincing picture. Summarizing the factors, he concludes: „On the basis of tho-
rough examination of the economic arguments and facts, I cannot say other then, that for an 
economy with similar size, structure and tradition, like Hungary, the permanent use of separate 
mean of payments, and burdening the related costs and risks on the population, is not advisable.” 
(Bod Péter Ákos, 2019: 8) 
More than half of the Hungarian population stably supports the Euro introduction. According 
to a recent representative (asking 1000 peoples) public opinion research, on the question: “Would 
you support the introduction of the Euro replacing the Forint as soon as possible?” from the total 
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Hungarian population, 65% answered with yes. (Pulzus Research - Pulzus Kutató, Index, June 
3, 2020.)
At the same time, there is no such a socio-economic interest group, which would take the case of 
the Euro on its shoulders. Traditionally, in general, the main supporters of the Euro introduction 
were the Transnational Companies. They were the main beneficiaries of the project, and the 
reduction of the transaction costs served primarily their interests. 
The Hungarian economy is one of the most transnationalized among the member countries. 
As it means dominance of foreign investors, there is no limit that these companies maximally 
use Euro where it is advantageous and desirable for them. And they broadly use it. At the same 
time, they have no disadvantage, but it is rather advantageous for them the existence of a parallel 
national currency, which is gradually devaluating. They conduct their international transactions 
in Euro, while, in case, it is definitely advantageous to finance wages, local services and supplies 
in the devaluating local currency. The dual currency systems are good from points of view of tax 
evasion, profit transfers and speculation.
Both large and smaller domestic companies are not active on global markets. The Euro 
for them is not of life importance. The main beneficiaries of the structural and agrarian funds 
are companies primarily oriented to domestic markets (food or construction companies), it 
is advantageous to get revenues in Euro, while calculating cost in local currency. The banking 
sector is largely counter-interested. The commercial banks fear of loosing the large conversion 
fees, while the national bank for loss of seigniorage incomes. 
The political scene is deeply divided, even inside the parties. No doubt, that taking over the 
single currency means limiting national sovereignty and room of manoeuvring (even if illusory), 
and therefore, the parties, particularly in governing positions are cautiously and reluctantly 
approaching the issue. The opposition is generally committed to the Euro, but as it is a risky 
campaign question, it does not hurry with relevant introduction strategy.
The introduction of the Euro in Hungary raises several strategic and also technical questions. 
In fact, we are parts of the EMU and we were assumed to take the aqui communautaire “upon 
entry”, and in these respects. The only derogation is the joining of the Euro-zone (originally the 
“third stage” of implementation). For this we have contractual obligation without deadline. 
As it is analysed by Bod Péter Ákos, we should stress that on the basis of high euroization 
of Hungarian economy, we are parts of the Euro-area (contrary to “zone”). Theoretically, we 
can speak about “dollarization” or “euroization”, if the proportions of these currencies in the 
national monetary circulation exceed 10%. There are no relevant and reliable calculations on 
these, but on the basis of the shares and export role of TNCs, the proportion of the Euro can be 
estimated substantial (probably exceeding 50%). In the private transfers and the retail sectors, 
these shares are less extended, but there is not without foundations to speak about a certain 
“creeping euroization”. In several sport sectors, the imported players are paid directly in Euro. In 
Croatia, the level of euroization seems to be higher (tourist incomes and pension transfers). “It 
is not exaggeration to tell that the Hungarian (Danish, Bulgarian or Czech) economic players 
are already long in the Euro-area, and only the population and the state are outside.” (Bod Péter 
Ákos, 2019: 4) 
In the last years, in the group of Euro candidates we can witness the formation a specific 
monetary construction. This is a dual currency system with floating exchange rates. The exception 
is Bulgaria, where a currency board was introduced with fixing the national currency to the Euro 
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already since 1997. The differences among the countries are in the mood of floatation (directed 
or spontaneous), in extent of devaluation and in relation of related policies.
It should be noted, that in Hungary in the following 10 years of 2008, the forint to the Euro 
was devaluated by about 30%. In the same period, the Czech crone and the Polish zloty showed 
a relative stability. (We do not speak about the events of last months.)
Due to complexity of processes, the analysis of effects of exchange rate changes is not easy. 
The impacts of devaluation, and their disadvantages are not easily identifiable. 
The devaluation does not improve “competitiveness”, but it creates possibility for adjustment. 
It can keep the producer on the market transitorily, gives a breathing time for making real steps 
for cutting costs and improving quality of the product. At the same time, as in the national 
currency it creates quasy-profitability, it can reduce the constraints for adjustment or postpone 
it. The free riding on the quasy-profitablity may be one of the most negative consequences 
of devaluation. How general is this free riding, is indicated by the example of continuously 
devaluating countries.
On the basis of Hungarian foreign trade structure, the question seems to be ambivalent. No 
doubt, that the devaluation can create unjustifiable incomes for TNCs and many local companies, 
while it is uncertain how far it helped the acquiring and keeping markets for the local Smes? As 
the local Smes are unable to hold on the global markets, this deficit of our integration seems to 
persisting.
Furthermore, as devaluation is reduction of welfare, namely it is restriction. Generally, 
socially more acceptable as through inflation it diffuses welfare losses to the whole society. 
The inflationary impacts of forint devaluation were not proportional, which can be explained 
by several factors. The money inflation was counterbalanced by demand and cost deflation 
(decrease of oil prices), and it seems that the demand deflation could even counterbalance such 
cost inflationary pressures as explosion of wages. Of course, we should distinguish between 
statistical and real inflation experience daily during our shopping. 
Theoretically, the construction of dual currency system is not new, in fact, it recalls the British 
proposals on the monetary integration (John Major). The Brits did not reject the monetary union. 
On contrary, they were in favour. And their proposals were not irrelevant.
The proposal was about “common” currency, parallel preserving the national monies. (Not 
surprisingly from a country formerly having an international key currency.) The proposal was 
definitely rejected by the German, and they voted in favour of the “single” currency. According 
to them, the supposed crowding our effects may have undesirable inflationary and redistribution 
impacts, and they should be avoided. In our region, these crowding out effects cannot be identified.
The dual currency systems of our region seem to be sustainable even for longer run. The 
direct constraints for changing to Euro are rather political and legal. The system is, however, 
sub-optimal, the counter-interests (TNCS, local large companies or banks) imply social losses. 
The arguments for Euro introduction clearly prove that.
For the coming years, it is difficult to make prognoses. From the six candidates, three 
(Bulgaria, Croatian and Romania) have already an accession program, and even the target dates 
are indicated. In the past, these target dates were postponed several times, but the chances of 
implementation are increasing. The possible Euro-zone joining of Romania and Croatia would 
raise the Hungarian entry to a national-political issue. 
The Czech and Polish staying outs are explained by strong sovereignty arguments. Of course, 
it would be difficult to deny how the monetary policy sovereignties are illusory. But they can be 
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overwritten by broader political considerations. Interestingly, the Slovak joining of the Euro-
zone were also based on sovereignty considerations, but with opposite signs. If they sit at the 
table of decision, they may influence them, while outside, these decision are made above their 
head. In fact, it should be noted, for Poland as for a medium power of the Union, these chances 
for influencing would be much favourable.
There are chances for further “creeping” euroization. For example, the reduction and 
elimination of cash transfers may offer several possibilities. In Hungary, it is also a future program. 
This could mean that the Euro is not introduced in cash forms, while parallel the national currency 
is also withdrawn from the financial turnover. On the accounts, the prices and the transfers can 
remain to be registered in both currencies, but the plastic card does not tell anything about what 
money was used. Of course, it assumes fixing the exchange rates and elimination of conversion 
fees. Later can be marginalized (tending to zero) by the present information techniques, and the 
banks can be compensated for loosing revenues from conversion fees.
Making reforms together
The consolidation and reforms of the Euro-system call for fundamental structural changes. The 
dealing with debt crisis has of utmost importance. The Euro so far has avoided the classical cur-
rency crises (inflation and devaluation), the euro crises were debt crises, originating primarily 
the Southern members. Management of debts are basically about debt cummulation, and there 
are no chances that they ever can and will be paid back. The paralyzing impacts are well known, 
and the situation can be aggravated by the Covid 19 crisis.
Due to largely increased heterogeneity of the participating countries, besides the stability, the 
convergence should also become strategic priority of the Euro-zone. The present cohesion crisis 
could be solved and the future ones can be avoided only this way.
There are several possibilities, but I think that the present Euro architectures should be 
supplemented by a set of Cohesion and Convergence Structures. Although, I find the “no transfer 
union” slogan highly misleading, I do not think that they should be about primarily money 
transfers. (The great parts of transfers are market transfers, and related to oligopolistic profits 
of large companies. While the burdens of fiscal transfers fall on tax payers, which raises delicate 
social and political questions.) 
The new structures should be based primarily on programs and policies. One of the major 
integration deficits of our region is the weak presence and position of local companies (mainly 
Smes) on the global markets. Among others, the supportive programs and policies could help 
acquisition and strengthening positions of these companies on external markets or their entry 
and up grading in the global value chains (which could attract the support of TNCs as well). 
Many of the Smes of developed countries meet the criteria of transnational company behaviours 
and policies, which in many respects one of the indicators of developed status of a country. 
The supportive programs could help sub-regional cooperation (including trans-border ones), 
could be crisis prevention and evasion measures for companies, organizations or individual 
(re-employment or re-training).
No doubt that we are interested in an economic and monetary union, which promotes 
convergence from inside. It is encouraging that there is a readiness on the developed members to 
think along these lines (Merkel-Macron).
KÖZ-GAZDASÁG 2020/236
There are discussions about premature joining. It is a typical alibi argument of opponents that 
we join the Euro-zone only when our economy is prepared for that. These usually imply that we 
need still long time till we reach such stage. As the case of several countries (Slovakia or Baltics) 
indicated, the question basically depended on the political determination.  By the early 2000s, the 
economies of the region reached a state that if this will existed and it was supported by a relevant 
preparation program, the joining could have been realized in a less then a decade perspective. 
On the other hand, if we are just only waiting for “maturing”, the whole thing can fade away for 
decades.
And as the Slovak example proved, in 2004 (year of joining the EU) our (Hungarian) target 
deadlines for 2008-2009 Euro introduction could have been realistic. The Slovaks were not in 
better position than us, and the about 5 years of preparation would have been enough for us as 
well. But the Slovaks had that determination and consequently implemented their adjustment 
program. I remember our governmental excuses that we should wait because it would mean too 
high social costs. At end, as it turned out, we had multiple social costs because of postponing. It is 
enough only to refer to the suffering of hundred thousands of victims of Swiss franc indebtedness, 
which could have been largely avoided by adoption of the Euro. 
At the moment, again, we have no serious reasons for waiting for fulfilment of vague 
convergence objectives. Rather we need serious proposals from those who support the case of 
joining. The bon mot is no longer valid that one should not move into a house which is smoking, 
but this is not the case with a half-built one. People buy half- built houses as they can decide 
about the colour of the wall and the tile, and the place of bath tub. I think that it would be basic 
Hungarian interest to take part directly and actively in the final reforms and completion of the 
Euro project. We should reconsider the slogan, that the case is not urgent.
It is obvious that due to Covid 19 crisis, the question lost its immediate actuality. Hungary, 
in the last years was close to meet Maastricht criteria, and it was only question of will to 
meet them (particularly, joining ERM). As result of the crisis, she somewhat distanced from 
them (budget deficits or debt), but still remained in position to easily fulfil them. But even 
if the perspectives of reconstruction and consolidation are uncertain, from point of view 
of rapid getting out from the present paralyzed situation, the issue remained of strategic 
importance.
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